Supreme Court of the United States

Origins

The Supreme Court of the United States was established by Article III of the Constitution, ratified in 1788, which vested federal judicial power in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Judiciary Act of 1789 organized the federal court system and set the Supreme Court’s membership at six justices (later expanded to nine). John Jay, Alexander Hamilton’s collaborator on the Federalist Papers, became the first Chief Justice, though the early Court struggled to define its role and attracted relatively little attention.

The Constitution’s brevity regarding the judiciary—Article III is far shorter than Articles I and II establishing Congress and the presidency—left much undetermined. The Court’s most consequential power, judicial review, appears nowhere in the constitutional text. The Framers debated whether courts could refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws, but the Constitution neither explicitly granted nor denied this authority. Federalist No. 78, written by Alexander Hamilton, argued that courts must have power to void laws conflicting with the Constitution, but this view was not universally shared.

The Court’s transformation came under Chief Justice John Marshall (1801-1835), whose thirty-four-year tenure established the judiciary as a coequal branch of government. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), Marshall asserted the Court’s authority to declare federal laws unconstitutional—the power of judicial review that would make the Court the Constitution’s ultimate interpreter. This seemingly logical claim was actually audacious: Marshall’s assertion that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” created a power the Constitution’s text did not clearly grant.

Structure & Function

The Supreme Court consists of nine justices—one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices—appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and serving during “good behavior,” effectively for life. This tenure insulates justices from political pressure, enabling independence but also creating concerns about accountability. The Court operates collegially: all nine justices hear cases together (though recusals sometimes reduce the number), and decisions emerge from deliberation and voting in private conference.

The Court exercises both original jurisdiction (cases it hears first, like disputes between states) and appellate jurisdiction (cases appealed from lower courts). Almost all cases reach the Court through petitions for writs of certiorari, requests that the Court review lower-court decisions. The justices exercise discretionary review, selecting roughly 100-150 cases per year from 7,000-8,000 petitions. Cases are selected based on their importance, conflict among lower courts, or significance for federal law—the Court generally does not correct mere errors but addresses issues of broad legal importance.

The Court’s opinions establish precedent binding on all lower federal courts and, for constitutional questions, on state courts as well. Majority opinions require at least five votes; justices may write concurrences (agreeing with the result but for different reasons) or dissents (disagreeing with the result). Over time, dissents sometimes become majority views as the Court’s composition or legal reasoning evolves. The process of distinguishing, limiting, and occasionally overruling precedents gives constitutional law a distinctive quality—simultaneously stable and evolving.

Historical Significance

The Supreme Court made the Constitution a living document, interpreted and reinterpreted across changing circumstances. Through judicial review, the Court has shaped American life in ways the Founders could not have anticipated: declaring segregation unconstitutional (Brown v. Board of Education, 1954), establishing rights to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) and abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973, later overruled in 2022), mandating equal legislative apportionment (Reynolds v. Sims, 1964), and defining the scope of presidential power. For better or worse, the Court has been central to America’s most contentious debates.

The institution has also demonstrated judicial review’s limitations and dangers. The Court’s antebellum defense of slavery (Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1857), its sanctioning of Jim Crow segregation (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896), and its obstruction of New Deal economic regulation (until 1937) show that judicial review can entrench injustice as readily as remedy it. The Court reflects, with some lag, the values of the political coalition that appoints justices. Its countermajoritarian capacity—the ability to override democratic decisions—remains controversial, celebrated when it protects rights and condemned when it frustrates popular will.

The American model of judicial review spread globally after World War II, as new constitutions established constitutional courts with explicit review authority. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, India’s Supreme Court, and others draw on American precedents while adapting them to different legal and political contexts. The idea that courts should enforce constitutional limits on government—once a peculiarly American institution—has become a global norm. Yet debates about the judiciary’s proper role, the interpretation of constitutional text, and the relationship between law and politics remain as vigorous as in Marshall’s time.